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Beyond the Privatisation and Re-nationalisation of the Argentine Pension 
System: Coverage, Fragmentation, and Sustainability 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the last decades, the pension system in Argentina has experienced important changes that 
included the introduction of an individual account defined-contribution component (or individual 
capitalisation) in 1994 and its subsequent reversal to a defined benefit pay-as-you-go pension 
scheme in 2008. After the 2001 crisis, the favourable fiscal position allowed the implementation 
of policies that reversed the decline in pension coverage to unprecedented levels, reaching over 
90% of the elderly.This article summarizes the main changes in the pension system in terms of 
its institutional organisation, financing and coverage, describes the current situation, and outlines 
the sustainability challenges that face future pension policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Argentina has been one of the ground-breaking countries in the pension system development in 
Latin America, which started around the end of the nineteenth century and the turn of the 
twentieth century. After reaching considerable coverage in the 1950s, the pension system, as a 
consequence of multiple factors (including those related to the reforms of the system itself), 
ceased to record the high financial surpluses it had exhibited during its development stage. 
During the early 1980s, substantial deficits derived in a crisis of the pension system (Ministry of Labour, 
2003).  
 Among the many changes to the regulatory framework, it is worth singling out the 1968 reform, 
which introduced parametric changes and made substantial progress in unifying the system, and 
the 1993 reform, which introduced parametric changes and an individual capitalisation 
component (or defined-contribution fully-funded scheme), thereby creating a mixed scheme.1 
The poor performance of the new system within a context of deteriorated economic, labour 
market and public finance indicators made it necessary to implement new changes to the system 
in the aftermath of the deep economic crisis of 2001-2002. The main reforms of the last decade 
aimed at: (a) improving coverage by expanding the contributive financing sources and the 
contributive and semi-contributive components of the system, and (b) introducing changes in the 
financing and design of the benefits, by restoring a defined-benefit pay-as-you-go scheme 
assisted by tax revenues, with a reserve fund for ensuring sustainability. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Mesa-Lago (2008) classifies the pension system reforms implemented in Latin America during the nineties, and 
defines mixed schemes as those whose structure combine a defined-benefit component with a defined-contribution 
component. The other two types of reform consist in the substitute models and the parallel models. The substitute 
models replaced the pay-as-you-go scheme by a defined-contribution scheme with individual pension savings 
accounts, while the parallel models created an individual capitalisation pension scheme operating simultaneously 
with a defined-benefit scheme. As it shall be explained herein below, the distinctive feature of the Argentine pay-as-
you-go scheme is that, in practice, it includes defined contributions and defined benefits, simultaneously. 
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Throughout history, the pension system has succeeded in consolidating high coverage, albeit 
with benefits which are regarded as insufficient, thereby generating significant distributive 
tensions. Pension policies have walked many roads, with varying priorities, hinged to the 
economic environment of each particular period.  
In the 1990s, the priority was to rescue the system from the long-term financing crisis which had 
resulted from the high implicit debt arising from its own maturity, design problems, and 
insufficient strength of the labour market. In contrast, in the last decade, the macroeconomic 
scenario showed encouraging results regarding growth and employment, shifting priorities 
toward improving coverage of benefits.  
While in the 1990s the priority was to reduce fragmentation and stratification of the system 
(albeit introducing new inequalities), in the first decade of this century, following the improved 
financing conditions and the increased coverage, the stratification path was resumed (i.e., certain 
categories of workers were restituted special schemes or particular conditions within the general 
scheme). 
The present challenges are, on one hand, to complete the process of placing the pension system 
in a path where the universal coverage and sustainability objectives are compatible, and, on the 
other hand, to ensure that future changes or reforms will result in improved equality, reduced 
fragmentation and increased predictability. This can be achieved by ensuring certain stability in 
sustainable financing rules, and in eligibility conditions and structure. Thus, the endemic high 
litigation rates of the system could be reduced.  
The purpose of this article is two-fold: to review the main institutional changes undergone by the 
Argentine pension system (from a historical perspective), while analysing its performance 
regarding certain key dimensions, including coverage, benefits and financing. Likewise, in view 
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of the great advances made in terms of coverage, this article presents and discusses the 
challenges posed by the continuation of high coverage, as well as some proposals for achieving 
such purpose. 
The paper is organized as follows: After this brief introduction, the second section concisely 
describes the historical evolution of the system, for continuing and completing the effort made in 
other documents to develop homogeneous historical statistics. The third section presents the 
macroeconomic, fiscal, and labour market contexts, within which the reforms to the social 
protection system were made in Argentina between 2002 and 2011. The fourth section analyses 
the recent reforms to the pension system, and the fifth section discusses some of the future 
challenges in sustaining the coverage levels achieved, and in ensuring universal coverage 
without disregarding equity in benefits. The sixth section draws the conclusions. 
 
2. OUTLINE OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE PENSION SYSTEM DURING THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Argentina has a long history of social protection, and it is one of the pioneering countries in 
developing social security in the region (Mesa-Lago, 2008), particularly as regards the pension 
system. The first legislation in this field was enacted in 1904, but it was not until 1944-1954 that 
the first qualitative leap in pension coverage was taken, when it reached most of salaried 
workers, through the creation of pension funds in different industries (Mesa-Lago, 1978; Arza, 
2010). 
At its inception, the system was highly fragmented, since each pension plan had its own 
eligibility requirements, contribution rates, and benefit rules (Isuani and San Martino, 1995); but 
in the following decades, gradual progress was piloted in an effort to unify and standardize it. 
	  	  
5	  
Thus, in the 1950s, the National Social Security Institute (INPS) was created to coordinate all 
pension funds. However, these developments encountered resistances to this intent (Feldman et 
al., 1986; Isuani, 2008), and the system fragmentation thus continued to be a distinctive feature 
throughout its expansion. 
In the late 1960s, an overall reform was carried out, which reduced the number of pension funds 
down to two schemes: one for self-employed workers, and the other one for salaried workers. 
Furthermore, this reform consolidated the pay-as-you-go approach and removed the presence of 
unions in pension funds, by nationalizing the whole system (Isuani and San Martino, 1995). 
The standardisation of the system was only partial, because of the existence of preference 
schemes for public servants of the three state Powers, for military members, police officers, 
penitentiary staff, and the clergy, among others. Besides, the members of the provincial and 
municipal public administrations were left out of the salaried workers' scheme. After this reform, 
in 1973, professional associations were authorized to implement complementary schemes, to be 
self-financed by their insured members (Feldman et al., 1986). 
The development of the system, together with emergency measures adopted during the second 
half of the 1970s (as discussed below), also brought about an increase in the number of benefits, 
since the early 1950s and the early 1980s, beneficiaries grew from 0.2 million to 2.3 million, 
which resulted in an increase of the coverage of the elderly from 12.6% to 58.0%. Later, during 
the rest of the 1980s, the increase in the number of beneficiaries kept pace with the growth of 
prospective beneficiary population, which reflects stagnant coverage levels (Isuani and San 
Martino, 1995). 
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Moreover, in the early 1960s, the system started to show signs of deteriorating financial 
conditions2, as well as difficulties to honour their obligations towards their beneficiaries 
(Dieguez and Petrecolla, 1974; 1977). This situation had caused legal actions to be brought 
against pension funds, and these could not face such actions due to their exhausted resources. In 
view of this serious problem, in 1966, pension fund resources were declared unseizable 
(Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani, 1986). Likewise, although in the early 1970s, the system 
remained well-balanced (Cetrángolo and Grushka, 2008), towards the end of the decade, it 
started to accumulate a financial deficit which soared during the 1980s, giving rise to what was 
termed the “the crisis of the pension system” (Ministry of Labour, 2003).	  
[Insert Graph 1 here]	  
This financial crisis of the pension system resulted from a number of factors: the exhaustion of 
the pension surplus typical of the early stages of development; the growing labour informality 
and the defaulting of pension obligations (evasion of contribution payments) which deteriorated 
the system’s dependency ratio; the changes in the demographic structure (decreases in fertility 
and mortality rates and the consequent ageing of the population); institutional weaknesses (e.g., 
granting a considerable number of disability benefits and allowing the proliferation of special 
regimes); apart from other macroeconomic factors (such as inflation), and the use of pension 
policy instruments with other macroeconomic policy purposes (e.g., “fiscal devaluations” 
through a reduction in employers’ contributions aimed at improving the international 
competitiveness of companies). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Negative results observed as from the 60s are rooted in the deficit of the Subsystem of State Pension Funds and 
Public Utilities Employees. This subsystem started to render negative results as from 1959 (Diéguez and Petrecolla, 
1977). 
	  	  
7	  
After the early signs of exhaustion of the system became apparent in the 1960s, the situation got 
even worse as a result of the extended coverage to include people who did not have the 
contributory background needed to be eligible, and of maintaining a defined benefit with a 
relatively high level of wage replacement as compared to the contributions effectively paid. The 
tax resources earmarked to sustain social security proved insufficient, and the promise of 
proportionality of benefits could not be honoured; thus, the pension system was faced with a 
growing loss of prestige. In the early 1990s, the pension system revealed a number of 
problematic characteristics:  considerable inequity among beneficiaries, poor transparency for 
contributors regarding the level of pension benefits to be received, high evasion of contributions, 
high deficit, and considerable indebtedness towards beneficiaries, arising from non-compliance 
with payments as provided for by the applicable regulatory framework (Cetrángolo and Grushka, 
2004; 2008). This unrestful context progressively raised the consensus on the need to make a 
deep reform, albeit with differences on its specific nature. 
Halfway through 1992, influenced by the reform context prevailing in the region and particularly 
by the pension system reform that had been implemented in Chile in 1981, a reform bill entered 
the National Congress and, after a long legislative debate, it was approved with amendments by 
mid-1993. The new pension scheme, the Integrated Pension System (SIJP), became effective in 
1994. 
This reform sought, among other goals, to solve the fiscal problem (in the long term) and the 
benefits dilemma3.  For this purpose, the main parameters to be eligible for pension benefits were 
modified by raising the retirement ages and the number of contribution years needed, and by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Other goals were sought as well, which were not directly related to the pension system, such as developing and 
strengthening the capital and insurance market. 
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changing the pay-as-you-go scheme for a mixed scheme, by introducing an individual 
capitalisation complementary scheme.  
The cost entailed by the transition to the new system, plus the impact of some economic policy 
measures, such as the transfers of deficitarian provincial pension funds and the reduction of the 
employers’ contributions, generated strong fiscal strain (Bertranou et al., 2003; Cetrángolo and 
Grushka, 2008). At the same time, the growing unemployment and labour informality, together 
with the change in the system parameters which strengthened its contributive approach, 
undermined the objective of increasing coverage of contributors and beneficiaries. Thus, towards 
the year 2000, the pension system presented considerable deficiencies in three key areas that 
define its performance: financial sustainability, coverage, and benefit amounts. Later, in 2002, 
the change in the macroeconomic context arising from the termination of the Convertibility 
Currency Regime4 system caused the real value of benefits to plummet. Likewise, the individual 
capitalisation pension scheme was strongly criticized due to its high commissions and costs 
related to the mandatory disability and survivorship insurances. When the effects of the 2001-
2002 crisis were left behind, the improved macroeconomic, fiscal and labour market 
performance allowed the governmental authorities to undertake a series of changes in the social 
security system, which changed its structure once again.  
 
3. FISCAL SPACE, LABOUR MARKET, AND SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 
During the 1990s, one of the factors which most affected coverage of social security in Argentina 
was increased labour informality and increased unemployment. In spite of the increased 
participation of women in the labour market between the 1980s and the early 1990s, the growing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Macroeconomic currency board system in force from 1991 until to 2001, whose main feature was the fixed rate of 
exchange establishing a Peso-Dollar peg. 
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unemployment and precarious labour constrained the coverage of the pension system. 
Particularly, the working-age population (between 18 and 65 years of age) contributing to the 
pension system decreased by around 10 percentage points in the 1990s, thus dropping from 38% 
in 1992 down to 27% in 2002, when the economic crisis burst out. 
[Insert Graph 2 here] 
The degradation of the labour market indicators during the 1990s, which worsened from 1998 
onwards, seriously affected the possibility of the active-age population to obtain a pension 
benefit when they reached legal retirement age. In fact, by the early 2000s, only around 30% of 
the system members had a contribution density over 70% (Bertranou and Sánchez, 2003; 
Ministry of Labour, 2005).    
The adoption of a new macroeconomic scheme, based on sustaining a competitive exchange rate 
and "twin” surpluses (both fiscal and external), reversed the contractionary trend of the economic 
activity level which prevailed in the 1999/2002 period, where the GDP dropped by 18.4% 
(Damill et al., 2011). This favoured an increase in employment, particularly in the formal 
salaried sector, which grew by 73% between 2003 and 2011. Additionally, the improved fiscal 
performance arising from the introduction of new taxes (export duties), higher collection levels 
of other existing taxes (VAT and income tax), and restrained fiscal expenditure in real terms, 
attributable to the public debt restructuring and the freezing of some disbursements in a higher 
inflation context, generated a fiscal space which leveraged economic recovery and growth 
between 2003 and 2007. The recovery context shaped an opportunity to increase the social 
protection framework, mainly by means of income transfer programmes targeted at vulnerable 
households, but also other initiatives mainly related to health care. 
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Specifically, significant changes were introduced as to the financing of the pension system. 
Contributions had long been insufficient, and financial assistance was required from earmarked 
taxes5, but the increased fiscal solvency allowed generating a surplus at the National Social 
Security Administration (ANSES)6 which ranged between 0.4 and 1.3% of GDP from 2004 
onwards (Graph 3). This result is attributable to several factors, including the recovery of formal 
employment, the increased tax resources earmarked to the system, and the erosion of the public 
expenditure resulting from the loss of purchasing power of benefits due to the lack of an 
automatic adjustment mechanism. Moreover, the higher expenses offset revenues resulting from 
the end of the individual capitalisation pension scheme, as it will be discussed below.   
[Insert Graph 3 here] 
The above mentioned ANSES surplus paved the way for reforms aimed at extending pension 
coverage, and financing the extension of family allowances to the unemployed and informal 
workers, by restructuring conditional cash-transfer programmes, which were implemented as a 
temporary response to the 2002 crisis.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5The financing of the social security general scheme consists of the “genuine” resources from contributions, as per 
the following composition:employers’ contributions, 12.7% and 10.2% of the payroll, with no applicable caps per 
industry; personal contributions set at 11% for salaried workers (with a cap at around 7 times the minimum living 
wage); contributions from high-income self-employed workers at a 27% of presumptive income; and a fixed amount 
called “Monotributo” (or Simplified Tax Scheme) for middle- and low-income self-employed workers (in 2011 it 
amounted to approximately a 6% of the minimum living wage).The other resources "assisting” social security 
financing are tax-related in nature:15% of the aggregate taxes to be shared among the Federal and the provincial 
governments (which en 2010 represented around an 18% of the total resources of the Argentine Integrated Pension 
System —SIPA—), and a specific allowance of a share of collections in respect of VAT, Income Tax, and other 
taxes (which, in 2010, amounted to around a 25% of the total SIPA resources).These tax resources represented in 
2010 a 4.1% of the VAT, while the total tax receipts in respect of all the earmarked taxes (to any degree for the 
SIPA) amounted to a 17.8% of the VAT. 
6Body which manages different components of social security: Retirements and pensions, family allowances and 
unemployment insurance. Additionally, it finances with current resources (and figurative revenues) non-contributive 
pension benefits and benefits from other schemes (such as the Armed Forces), andthe health insurance for non-
contributive pension beneficiaries. Since 2010, the ANSES has also financed the digital literacy and inclusion 
programme called Connecting Equality (ConectarIgualdad), which includes giving out notebooks. 
7 The main programmes were: the Programme for Unemployed Household Heads (Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar 
Desocupados), which reached two million beneficiaries, and subsequently, the Families for Social Inclusion Plan 
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4. REFORMS TO THE PENSION SYSTEM SINCE 2005 
In the last decade, many changes have been introduced in the pension system, particularly since 
2005. These changes endeavoured to solve the low coverage problem, to restore the value of 
benefits by ensuring their mobility (i.e., automatic adjustment to the financing state of the 
pension system), and to increase the role of the State in managing the system. In this regard, the 
individual account defined-contribution pension scheme was terminated, and this made 
Argentina a paradigmatic case of structural reform reversion8.  Some special schemes were also 
restored, and new differential schemes were created for unhealthy activities.  
 
a) Extension of coverage 
In early 2005, the eligibility requirements for benefits were eased thanks to the creation of a 
“pension moratorium” which allowed workers (or their beneficiaries) to access pension benefits 
even if they had not completed the minimum number of contribution years.9The pension 
moratorium, later termed Pension Inclusion Plan (Plan de Inclusión Previsional), was based on 
amendments to a law that had been enacted in 1993 and which made it easier for workers to 
enrol in a voluntary scheme for debt regularisation through contributions for self-employed 
workers. This scheme enabled workers with incomplete labour trajectories, or even people with 
no labour history at all, to apply for and become eligible to receive a pension benefit (Arza, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Plan Familias para la Inclusión Social). The expansion of family allowances took place in 2009, when the so-
called Universal Child Allowance (AUH) was introduced (Bertranou and Maurizio, 2012). 
8 Soon after the individual capitalisation scheme was ended in Argentina, Hungary took steps towards a similar 
reform (See Hirose, 2011).  
9 Also, due to the difficulties in employment encountered by adults about to reach legal retirement age, a benefit 
called Early Retirement was created through Law 25865 in 2004, aimed at benefitting those persons who had 
completed the number of contribution years required to access a pension benefit (30 years) but had not reached legal 
retirement age (60 years old for women; 65 years old for men). The number of benefits granted under this scheme 
was low, since between 2005 and 2010 (when it became void), only 47.184 benefits were granted. 
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2012a). Thus, once this benefit has been granted, beneficiaries may request their outstanding 
monthly payments of the regularisation scheme to be discounted therefrom. The moratorium is of 
permanent nature, but it only benefits the current cohorts of elderly people, because in the future, 
younger cohorts will not be able to “declare contribution years” through a plan designed to 
recognize the debt generated prior to September 1993. 
By means of this moratorium, from 2005 to September 2011, 2,7 million new benefits were 
granted, which represented over 40% of the current total amount of pension-related benefits. 
This increase in the number of benefits enabled pension coverage to be restored, which had 
deteriorated by 10 percentage points between 1994 and 2004, and to be raised over 90% (Graph 
4). Thus, the pension coverage in Argentina is among the highest in Latin America (Rofman and 
Oliveri, 2012). 
[Insert Graph 4 here] 
The extension of coverage resulting from the pension moratorium benefited groups of the 
traditionally most vulnerable adult population:  Women, and people with a low educational level. 
Among women, pension coverage rose from 66% in 2005 to 93% in 2010, even higher than 
men’s 87%, who tend to remain proportionally more in the labour market. On the other hand, 
pension coverage among those with incomplete primary education also rose by 27 p.p., as 
compared to a 22 p.p. general increase. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Beneficiaries of these regularisation plans receive a minimum (or slightly higher than minimum) 
benefit. However, around 30% of the new beneficiaries were already receiving another pension 
benefit. The legislation governing the moratorium initially did not ban elderly people already 
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having a pension benefit, e.g. a survivorship benefit, from accessing their pension benefit.10 In 
2011, the ratio of the number of beneficiaries (4.6 million) to the number of benefits (5.4 
million) was 85%; this means that 17% of beneficiaries included in the Argentine Integrated 
Pensions System (SIPA) has a two-fold coverage within the system.11 
In the year 2010, the outlays related to the new benefits of the moratorium rose to 2.1% of GDP, 
but the moratorium payments collected amounted to around 0.5% of GDP, and this implies a net 
cost of 1,6% of GDP. This expense should gradually decrease as deaths outnumber new receivers 
of new benefits. However, collections from payments are expected to drop more rapidly, since 
pension debt financing plans did not exceed 5 years, and payments are for fixed, non-indexed 
amounts. 
It should be noted that, as from the year 2004, a major increase in the coverage of non-
contributive pensions (PNC) was recorded. PNCs went from 0.3 million in 2003 to 1.2 million in 
2011, because of the increase in disability PNCs (from 82 thousand to 690 thousand) and PNCs 
for mothers of 7 or more children (from 59 thousand to 304 thousand). In 2004 and 2005, old-
age benefits, which are granted to adults over 70 in poverty conditions, were also raised; 
however, its beneficiaries adhered to the pension moratorium, which granted them a higher 
benefit.1213In 2010, public expenditure associated to PNCs rose to 0.74% of GDP; its main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10After the implementation of the moratorium, it was stipulated that those who had a pension benefit had to pay the 
total debt in cash, however, justice ruled in favor of an equalitarian treatment, allowing payment of debts in 
installments in all cases. 
11Before the implementation of the moratorium, in December 2004, approximately a 10% of beneficiaries of the 
pension system had a two-fold coverage.Benefits from other systems are not considered herein. 
12 Monetary benefit of old-age welfare pensions is equivalent to a 70% of the minimum pension, while the benefit 
granted on account of pension moratorium is similar to the minimum pension, but moratorium payments are 
discounted for a period not exceeding 60 months. Likewise, the health coverage is also modified: while the PNCs 
have the Federal Health Programme, the beneficiaries of the contributive system, for which moratorium 
beneficiaries are eligible, have the National Institute of Social Services for Pensioners. 
13In this case, two-fold coverage cannot exist, since no other coverage from any other benefit, neither contributive 
nor non-contributive, can be received in order to be eligible for a non-contributive old-age pension. 
	  	  
14	  
component being the disability welfare benefits (0.33 of GDP) followed by the benefits for 
mothers of 7 or more children (0.24% of GDP). 
Regarding the fast expansion of the new pensions arising from the pension moratorium which 
took place between late 2006 and early 2007, municipal governments played a fundamental role 
in disseminating information on the policy, cooperating with the ANSES to manage pensions, 
and assisting the vulnerable elderly.14 
On the other hand, the extension of the PNCs arises from the removal of budgetary restrictions to 
their granting, from the increased awareness of the population regarding these benefits (in 
cooperation with provincial and municipal governments), and from improved aspects of the 
procedures for granting new benefits (Bertranou et al., 2011).     
 
b) Restoring the replacement rate 
As from the year 2002, measures started to be implemented aiming at restoring the purchasing 
power of pension benefits, which had been affected by the devaluation of the Peso. This policy 
was carried out by tranches until 2008, favouring the increase of the minimum benefit. As from 
the enactment of the Law on Pension Mobility in 2008, benefits were adjusted on the basis of 
predetermined parameters that reflected the evolution of active workers' salaries and of the 
contributive and tax resources earmarked to the pension system. Benefits started to be adjusted 
on a proportionally uniform basis for all benefits.  
Between mid-2002 and mid-2008, the minimum benefit increased by 360%, while higher 
pensions grew only between 63% and 79%. Considering the increases granted by virtue of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14Since those who adhere to the moratorium must pay at least the first installment to be eligible for the monetary 
benefit, municipal governments often had to undertake the responsibility of paying this first installments for elderly 
persons who did not have the necessary economic resources to manage their pension. The remaining installments are 
automatically discounted from the benefit granted by the ANSES. 
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Law on Pension Mobility from 2002 to 2012, the minimum pension benefit increased by 
1,025%, while pensions over such minimum grew between 299% and 339%.  
As a consequence of the restoration of benefits, the concentration of the number of minimum 
benefits rose by 60% in 2005 and, due to the inclusion of over 2 million beneficiaries from the 
pension moratorium (most of whom receive the minimum benefit), by 73% in 2010 (Graph 5). 
However, excluding moratorium pensioners, the concentration as of 2010 is around 50% (similar 
to 1992 or 2002), with a decreasing trend arising from the new “non-moratorium” pensioners 
receiving benefits above the minimum. 
[Insert Graph 5 here] 
The policy for updating pension benefits had its impact on the average replacement rates of the 
system. The average replacement rate in terms of the average taxable wage for stable workers 
(RIPTE) dropped from 44% to 41% between 2001 and 2005; however, general rises granted 
since 2006 allowed its being raised to 48% for non-moratorium benefits (Bertranou et al., 2011). 
As per the reform introduced in 1994, the replacement rate of the initial benefit is equal to the so 
called Universal Basic Benefit (PBU)15 plus the Additional Benefit for remaining in the public 
scheme (PAP), equal to 45% of the average wage of the last ten years for a worker who has 
completed 30 contributions years (up to 52.5% with 35 contribution years). Both components of 
the benefit are set as per the Law on Pension Mobility; however, the PBU has lagged behind as 
compared to the minimum pension rises granted during the 2002-2006 period. In this way, the 
PBU has lost weight in terms of average wage, and in turn this has particularly affected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15Originally, in 1994, the value of the PBU was equal to 27.5% of the mean wage of the economy (which includes 
both formal and informal employment) and represented an around 18% replacement ratio with regard to the 
RIPTE.In December 2011, this pseudo replacement ratio was 13%. 
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replacement rates of medium- and high-income workers, rather than that of low-income workers 
who stand a better chance of being included in the minimum benefit. 
The average replacement rate is not easy to assess in a system where different schemes coexist, 
some of which make contributions based on a low presumptive income. The taxable-income 
replacement rate pertinent to the group of self-employed workers encompassed by the 
"Monotributo" scheme has risen particularly. This worker category represents 12% of the total 
contributors to the pension system. Contributions made by these workers to be eligible in the 
future to receive a minimum benefit may involve a replacement rate over 100%, with a growing 
trend in the last ten years, since the contribution grew by 214% (from $35 to $110 per month) 
and the benefit, by 744% (from $200 to $1687)16. There are also other groups with subsidized 
contributions, although not explicitly so; e.g., domestic service workers and self-employed 
workers included in the Social Simplified Tax Scheme, i.e. “monotributistas sociales”. However, 
it should be borne in mind that the Monotributo scheme was introduced in the late 1990s, and 
that part of the workers registered in this scheme do not have long work histories in this scheme 
and they rotate significantly to and from salaried employment (Bertranou and Maurizio, 2011).   	  
 
c) Removal of the individual capitalisation component  
As from 2007, measures have been implemented aiming at increasing the weight of the pay-as-
you-go scheme, including the free choice between the pay-as-you-go scheme and the individual 
capitalisation scheme, the direct inclusion in the pay-as-you-go scheme of labour market entrants 
who did not make use of their choice (“undecided”), as well as of soon-to-be-retired persons with 
scant accumulated funds. Before this change, the “undecided” new entrants into the labour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16Workers registered under the Monotributoscheme make a fixed-amount monthly contribution equal to a 6% of the 
minimum wage in 2011.This makes them eligible to receive in the future a minimum benefit which, in 2011, 
amounts to a 66% of the minimum wage. 
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market were assigned directly to the individual capitalisation scheme; moreover, contributors in 
the individual capitalisation scheme were not allowed to shift to the pay-as-you-go scheme. In 
the same way, contributors of some special schemes were transferred to the pay-as-you-go 
scheme. 
Finally, in December 2008, the individual capitalisation scheme was terminated when its 
members and beneficiaries were transferred to the pay-as-you-go scheme, and the SIPA was 
created. 
These reforms entailed a change in the system’s management and in the parameters that 
determine the benefits to be received at the legal retirement age. Before the reforms of 2007, the 
initial benefit for any scheme member was the summation of the PBU and the Compensatory 
Benefit (PC)17, which was added to the PAP (0.85% for every contribution year —minimum 30 
and maximum 35 years— multiplied by the average wage of the last ten contribution years) for 
those who remained in the pay-as-you-go scheme, or the Ordinary Pension (in terms of the 
accrued balance existing in the individual capitalisation account) for members of the individual 
capitalisation scheme. From 2007 onwards, the return of the contributions made into the pay-as-
you-go scheme grew as a result of raising the PAP factor from 0.85% to 1.5%, making it equal to 
the PC factor.  
By removing the individual capitalisation component, the State committed itself to guarantee 
individual capitalisation scheme beneficiaries and members equal or better benefits than those 
they were entitled to prior to the reform; however, this is hard to compare, since the individual 
capitalisation scheme did not ensure any defined benefit (Mesa-Lago, 2009). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The PC acted as a recognition of the contributions made by all the workers prior to the implementation of the SIJP 
(1994 reform).  
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The termination of the individual capitalisation component implied the transfer to the ANSES of 
all personal contribution flows which so far had been accruing in the individual capitalisation 
accounts, estimated in around 1.4% of GDP. The Capitalisation Pension Fund (the stock of 
resources accrued in all individual capitalization accounts) was also transferred and incorporated, 
together with the ANSES financial surpluses, to a reserve fund known as the Sustainability 
Guarantee Fund (FGS). The FGS was mandated to preserve the financial stability of the SIPA 
and to foster economic development. In 2010, the FGS portfolio represented a 12% of the GDP 
and its net income represented around 7% of the ANSES total income.  
 
d) New differential and special schemes 
From 2005 onwards, some special schemes were reinstated, which had been repealed in 1994. 
This revocation had triggered multiple legal claims and had also been modified by other 
regulatory amendments introduced in 2002 (Ministry of Labour, 2003). 
The preference schemes which were reinstated were the Special Schemes for Teachers, Science 
and Technology Researchers, and University faculty members. Certain regimes that had not been 
revoked under the special schemes revision of 1992 remained in force, including those for 
magistrates and officials of the Judicial Power, of the National Public Prosecution Authority, and 
of the National Prosecuting Authority on Administrative Investigation; for the President and 
Vice-president of the Nation, the National Supreme Court Judges, and the National Foreign 
Service Staff.  
Basically, all these schemes stipulate more favourable retirement conditions, including fewer 
contribution years, lower retirement age, and more generous benefits than those granted in the 
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general scheme. Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of these schemes, and their 
differences as compared to the general scheme (governed by Law No. 24,241). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Likewise, from 2007 to 2011, changes have been introduced in the schemes applicable to 
population groups working in risky, arduous or unhealthy tasks, or in tasks that can result in 
premature ageing or exhaustion of working capacity. In 2007, a differential scheme was created 
for the workers of the Río Turbio Coal Deposits and of the Railroad and Port Services with 
Terminals in Punta Loyola and Río Gallegos, which raised the replacement rate to 82%. To that 
end, the contribution was also raised by 2%. In 2009, a differential pension scheme was created 
for salaried workers of the construction industry, which set retirement age at 55 years of age (for 
both men and women), and a 5% additional contribution rate on employers' contributions. In 
2010, the benefits of the differential scheme were extended to include port stevedores, foremen, 
and crane operators (retirement age between 52 and 55 years of age), and to other groups of 
workers who carry out identical tasks on their own account or in association with cooperatives. 
Finally, in 2011, a differential scheme was created for rural workers, with a retirement age set at 
57 (no gender distinction), 25 contribution years, and a 3% additional employer’s contribution. 
 
5. PENSION SYSTEM, WELFARE, AND LIVING CONDITIONS OF ELDERLY 
ADULTS  
Pension systems play a very important role in ensuring a secure income for elderly adults 
(ECLAC, 2006). In Argentina, the horizontal extension of the pension coverage had dropped 
towards 2001, albeit still high, which allowed elderly adults and their families to have a reliable 
economic security buffer to face the 2002 crisis. The subsequent increase in coverage and value 
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of benefits allowed the system to play one of its essential roles, which is to prevent old-age 
poverty for the current generation of elderly adults. In fact, elderly adults are the population 
group with the lowest incidence of poverty and extreme poverty. In 2010, the incidence of 
poverty among the elderly was only 2.4% (77% lower than the 10.5% general rate), while among 
children and adolescents it was 17.8% (70% higher than the general rate). 
After the extension of the pension coverage, the percentage of pension income relative to the 
total income of elderly adults rose from 69% to 83% between 2005 and 2010.  
From 2005 to 2010, simultaneously to the extension of pension coverage, the number of elderly 
adults who get their sustenance in the labour market fell18; the percentage of people with no 
pension coverage whose source of income stems exclusively from the labour market (excluding 
family arrangements) dropped from 13.4% to 8.0%, although the percentage of employed people 
with pension coverage grew by 3.6 p.p. (from 5.5% to 9.1%). In overall terms, the percentage of 
employed elderly adults decreased by around 1 p.p., but the percentage of unemployed elderly 
adults dropped even more.  
Thus, between 2005 and 2010, the participation rate (PEA) of elderly adults dropped, albeit to a 
greater degree for women. The activity rate for men showed very little variation, while for 
women it dropped by 9.1 p.p., from 26.4% to 15.0%. This represented the most important 
variation within the 65 to 69 age group (although a significant reduction is also seen in the 60 to 
64 age group for women). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18It should be borne mind that the institutions and financing of the social security system are factors that contribute 
to determine the participation of elderly people in the labour market. There are some other factors, such as health, 
employment demand behaviour, labour insertion type, characteristics of the elderly adults’ households, and 
sustenance they receive from the family group, that also affect their participation in the labour market (ECLAC, 
2006, Alós et al. 2008, Barrientos, 2011). 
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The most vulnerable group of elderly adults, that is, elderly adults who do not participate in the 
labour market or who, when they do, are unemployed and do not have a pension benefit, has 
shrunk quantitatively from 25% in 2005-2006 to 7% in 2010.19 
With an improved distribution of income, attributable to factors from the labour and social 
protection market (Gasparini and Cruces, 2008, Ministry of Labour, 2010), the position of 
elderly adults increased in the third quintile of the distribution.20 It should be noted that the 
participation of the pension income in the total income of elderly adults grew significantly and 
specially in the lower-income quintiles (47 p.p. in quintile 1, and 15 p.p. in quintile 2).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In the same way, in a scenario were employment and salaries also grew, the share of income 
from pensions of elderly adults within the total population income mass rose from 10.9% to 
11.6%.21 This participation effect, together with a less concentrated distribution of pension 
income (concentration effect) accounts for an important portion of the decrease in income 
inequality evidenced in recent years (OIT, 2012; Trujillo and Villafañe, 2011).    
 
6. CHALLENGES TO ENSURE EQUITY AND UNIVERSAL COVERAGE  
In view of the above, the following conclusion can be drawn regarding the performance of the 
current system in two core dimensions: financing and coverage.  The increase in formal 
employment and the reduction in labour informality have succeeded in rebuilding and increasing 
the source of contributive resources of the system. At the same time, thanks to the good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The vast majority of these persons receives some kind of assistance from the other household members, while a 
very reduced group has some type of income from sources other than the labour market or pension benefits. 
20 The percentage of elderly adults rose by 6.6 p.p.; it dropped by 1.8 in the first quintile (the poorest) and 4.4 p.p. in 
the fifth quintile (the richest).  
21 This increase in share was observed to the detriment of the source that adds other non-labour income, since, in the 
same period, the weight of labour income in the total income of the population also grew.   
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performance of the economy in terms of growth after the 2001-2002 crisis, the tax resources 
earmarked to the pension system have also been remarkable. In turn, the elderly adults’ coverage 
has expanded to over 90%, which is an unprecedented achievement in Argentina.   
However, as in every pension system, there are numerous challenges that still need attention: i) 
to preserve the system’s sustainability, by adopting predictable parameters for administrators and 
insured parties, in order to reduce litigation rates (i.e., lawsuits brought against the ANSES by 
beneficiaries); ii) to attain universal coverage without the need for emergency measures; iii) to 
improve equity in both its horizontal dimension, by closing coverage gaps (mainly as regards 
contributions in employment), and in its vertical dimension, by improving replacement rates 
(adequacy of benefits); and to improve equity across groups (system fragmentation) and across 
genders (Arza, 2012b; Bertranou et al., 2011; Mesa-Lago, 2009). These three challenges are 
analysed below. 
 
a) Financial sustainability 
The reforms to the pension system in Argentina during the 2000s brought about a substantial 
increase in coverage (Graph 4) within a context where both the pension system (Graph 1 and 
Graph 3) and the ANSES are in a better fiscal position. The improved situation of this institution 
was observed even in 2010, after the pension system coverage and non-contributive pensions had 
been extended, and the Universal Child Allowance had been implemented.22 Between 2005 and 
2010, the ANSES recorded a financial surplus between 0.8% and 1.3% of GDP. 
The financial improvement of the ANSES is aligned with an improved fiscal situation of the 
Non-financial National Public Sector (SPNnF), in contrast to the high deficits recorded in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For further information on the characteristics of this social protection policy, see Bertranou and Maurizio (2012). 
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second half of the 1990s, particularly between 1999 and 2001. During this period, the National 
Government financed the transition costs (associated with the introduction of the individual 
capitalisation scheme) which rose because of other policies, such as the reduction of employers' 
contributions and the transfer of provincial pension funds to the federal sphere (Bertranou et al., 
2003; Cetrángolo and Grushka, 2004).  
A solid financial position of the pension system is of vital importance to sustain the pension 
coverage level reached, which is close to being universal. In this sense, the nationalisation of the 
individual capitalisation component has improved the short-term fiscal outlook of the system 
after the expansion of coverage. As mentioned above, the incorporation of 2.7 million new 
beneficiaries has had a net cost of 1.6% of the GDP, while the recovery of the personal 
contribution flows that were formerly destined to the individual capitalization accounts 
represented a 1.4% of GDP, thereby increasing the current resources of the SIPA. However, 
there are other even more relevant factors that have improved the financial situation of the 
system: an increase in formal employment figures, increased real salaries, and output growth. 
However, new spending responsibilities have been undertaken for the future, for which no 
actuarial assessment has been made as to their long-term financial sustainability. Some 
projections performed before and after the 2008 reform (Cetrángolo and Grushka, 2008; Federal 
Controlling Authority —AGN—, 2010) show the persistence of a deficitarian “pure” result when 
accounting only for wage and salaries contribution resources. In this way, projections underscore 
the critical role of tax resources in financing the SIPA.  
The high litigation rate is one of the aspects making it difficult to assess the financial 
sustainability of the system. This is not new in itself (Schulthess and Demarco, 1993), but it has 
recently become a key issue. Legal actions have focused on the mobility (adjustment) of benefits, 
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particularly as to benefit updating during the 2002-2006 period, when only the minimum benefit 
was updated, and on the determination of the initial benefit, particularly the updating of salaries 
serving as a basis for computing benefits. At present, there are over 400 thousand legal actions 
outstanding (Bertranou et al., 2011). According to Bossio (2012), the generalisation of the 
judgements rendered by the Supreme Court of Justice on updating of benefits and determining of 
initial benefits would represent an annual expenditure of 2.0% of GDP.23 
Another aspect to take into consideration in assessing the financial sustainability are the 
employers’ contributions which, due to different provisional measures, still remain below those 
stipulated in the 1994 reform.  
Likewise, it is also important to analyse fiscal federalism issues, that is, tax resources that 
finance SIPA’s pension benefits, through specific earmarking of federally coshared taxes 
between the national and provincial governments, and through mechanisms of “advance 
cosharing”24 of taxes. Currently, two distinct situations are observed:  
a) The provinces which transferred to the national government their pension funds for civil 
servants, also transferred their financial unbalances, but, once incorporated into the SIPA, 
the retirement conditions of their employees were matched to those of the general 
scheme.  
b) A majority group of provinces which did not transfer their pension funds have been 
negotiating with the national government for over 10 years now, in an effort to harmonize 
their pension schemes for civil servants with the SIPA (formerly termed SIJP). These 
governments receive financial assistance from the national government to finance the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23The breakdown for this figure is 0.8% of updatings of benefits exceeding the minimum amount in the 2002-2008 
period, and 1.2% of the determination of the initial benefit. 
24These are resources that are allocated to the pension system before the revenue sharing rules are applied to the 
mass of resources subject to be coshared. 
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deficits of their pension funds, even though, in practice, the progress towards 
harmonising the provincial systems and the SIPA has not been substantial; in fact, 
differences still remain, such as lower retirement ages and higher replacement rates 
(Bertranou et al., 2011).  
After the termination of the SIPA individual capitalisation component, with provincial 
governments undergoing certain fiscal problems, the modest progress made as to 
harmonising and financing provincial pension deficits has prompted claims by some 
provincial governments25, demanding a 15% reimbursement of federally co-shared taxes. 
This percentage had been assigned to the national sphere to finance the transition cost 
arising from the 1994 reform. The worsening of these conflicts on fiscal federalism may 
jeopardise the sustainability of an important financing source which, as mentioned above, 
represents an 18% of the total SIPA resources.      
Finally, another aspect to take into account in assessing the financial sustainability of the system 
is the demographic transition. Argentina is currently undergoing a transition process, also known 
as demographic window, where the proportion of working-age population rises relative to 
children, adolescents and elderly adults. In addition, population ageing in Argentina is at an 
intermediate stage. Around 2010, the fraction of the overall population 65 years old or more was 
11%, and it is expected to reach 19% by 2050. This increase will be matched by the rate of adult 
dependency26, which is expected to rise from 19% to 34% in the same period.27 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25Even judicial lawsuits in some cases. 
26Ratio between the population over 65 and the population between 20 and 64 years old. 
27Annex 2 presents statistics on the evolution of the population composition. 
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b) Universal coverage 
As shown in Graph 4, policies favouring the expansion of the horizontal coverage have had a 
considerable impact: the pension coverage in the population over 65 rose from 68% to 91% 
between 2004 and 2010.28	   
In contrast with other experiences in the region (Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia), the expansion of the 
pension coverage was mainly based on ad-hoc and transitory measures. This allowed the impact 
of these measures to be practically immediate, with no need to wait for their effects in future 
cohorts. The moratorium, still in force, allows the cancellation of unpaid contributions to the 
system until September 1993; therefore, the number of elderly adults that may benefit from this 
measure decreases with time.  
In 2011, with the benefit scheme currently in force, the 30 contribution years needed to be 
eligible for the benefits could be eased by registering in the pension moratorium. Thanks to this 
policy, the persons who have reached legal retirement age but have not contributed to the system, 
may be eligible to the minimum pension benefit. However, in around 10 years’ time, people who 
are close to retiring will need to have made contributions for approximately 10 years; in 20 years' 
time, only 10 contribution years will be recognized in this moratorium; and in 30 years’ time, 
this measure will concede no benefit29. 
In this way, if no further ad-hoc measures are implemented (such as the moratorium) or there are 
no further substantial changes in the regulatory provisions in force, it is improbable that the 
pension coverage level attained can be sustained, because of the relatively low contribution 
coverage (density) of active population in the labour market (Graph 2). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Annex 1 presents a summary of the old-age, disability and survivorship benefits within the national “system” 
including the Argentine Integrated Pension System - SIPA and the non-contributive scheme managed by the 
Ministry of Social Development (MSD). 
29 There are gender differences as to the different retirement age requirements (65 for men, 60 for women). 
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It is necessary to add a pure and permanent solidarity component ensuring pension coverage, not 
only for the sake of equity and predictability, but also of being able to ensure universal coverage 
in the future. The resulting benefit from this component should be financed with general income 
resources (Bertranou, et al. 2011). 
 
c) Equity 
The strategy to be implemented to ensure the universal horizontal coverage should be 
complemented by benefits which are also respectful of vertical equity. In this sense, the pure 
solidarity component of universal coverage should be complemented by a contributive 
component granting benefits in respect of contributions, which may continue to be organized as 
per a pay-as-you-go scheme, yet keeping the door open to complementing such contributions 
with voluntary savings, aiming at further improving the replacement rate. The pillar making it 
possible to increase the amount of benefits should also include workers with incomplete labour 
trajectories, in the form of a benefit granted as a "complement for workers with few yearsof 
contributions” and provide an additional redistributive component higher than the social 
protection floor. In other words, this pillar should be based on some solidarity principles. 
[Insert Graph 6 here] 
The importance of the pure solidarity pillar (universal benefit) and of the complement for 
workers with scarce contributions matters to equity for a number of reasons: Firstly, taking into 
account the output, unemployment, informal labour, job turnover, and contribution density rates 
(Bertranou and Sánchez, 2003; Ministry of Labour, 2005; Forteza et al., 2001) it is estimated that 
the majority of people presently in working-age will not be eligible for a pension benefit due to 
difficulties to make the necessary contributions (30 contribution years).  
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Meanwhile, another equity problem caused by the present scheme with no moratorium, is that 
most of the benefits would continue to be financed with general tax resources, some of these 
being regressive in nature (such as the Value Added Tax), and would inure to the benefit of only 
a select group of people with a sufficient contribution history. 
Another aspect to consider as to equity is the need to introduce reforms that take into account the 
respective situation of both men and women. Generally speaking, the redistributive components 
of the present system (such as the minimum pension) allow tempering the effects of the unequal 
labour histories of women as compared to men, that is, a lower participation in the labour 
market, more interruptions in their careers, higher labour informality, and occupational 
segregation. The reforms to consider may include measures to promote and implement a better 
insertion of women in the formal labour market, as well as to recognize, within their contribution 
years, their contribution as to their household care responsibilities, e.g., their child rising tasks 
(Arza, 2012; Mesa-Lago, 2009). A gradual lowering of the difference in legal retirement age for 
men and women should also be assessed, as should be the structure of benefits that allows two-
fold full benefits for old-age and survivorship.    
Other sources of inequity are fragmentation and high litigation rates, which stem from the 
unpredictable nature of the system. In order to reduce litigation rates in the future, predictable 
parameters should be defined, for both administrators and the population at large. Regarding 
fragmentation, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of special (preference) and 
differential (unhealthy activities) schemes, which, although some of them may be reasonably 
justifiable, have been merged into the public system, thereby hindering the possibility of 
assessing every scheme individually. Possibly, the differences of these specific groups of 
workers could be covered by complementary schemes (Bertranou et al., 2011). Likewise, 
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problems persist as to unequal treatment and fragmentation, derived from there being over 120 
pension funds for specific groups of workers who are not included in the general scheme 
(Cetrángolo, 2009; Mesa-Lago, 2009).30 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In practice, whatever the type of financing and the institutional organization of the system, the 
performance of the pension system is closely linked to the evolution of output and formal 
employment (Barr, 2002; Bertranou, 2005). These two variables, in addition to the political 
decision of prioritizing the living conditions of elderly adults, have allowed a remarkable 
improvement of the resources earmarked for benefits and the coverage extension in Argentina in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.   
Key dimensions of the pension system performance have improved substantially in recent years. 
Firstly, pension coverage rose from 71% in 2001 to 91% in 2010. Secondly, the average 
replacement rate grew by 4 percentage points between 2001 and 2010, and legislative changes 
were introduced aimed at ensuring a six-monthly adjustment of benefits, so as to protect them 
from inflation. Lastly, contributions were recovered as a source of financing of the pay-as-you-
go scheme, as a consequence of the improvement of formal employment, the increase in real 
salaries, and the nationalisation of the individual capitalisation component. Thus, contributions to 
the pension system, which financed only a 32% of the pension expenditure in 2001, in 2010 this 
percentage rose to 80% (Graph 1). 
The policies increasing coverage and terminating the individual capitalisation scheme make it 
possible to sustain the system in the medium term, but they do not ensure high coverage levels 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30Annex 3 presents a snapshot of the system as of 2010, with the overall distribution of elderly adult population, 
according to the kind of pension benefit. 
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and financial sustainability in the long term. Accordingly, the challenge of designing a 
sustainable pension system providing a universal coverage still remains. Moreover, other aspects 
that remain to be fully considered in the present scheme are: equity, fragmentation, 
predictability, litigation rate, and sustainability. 
However, the challenge facing public policies does not consist in designing a kind of reform that 
may solve all present and future problems once and for all. On the contrary, the alternative 
solution is to agree on some strategic principles and ideas to construct a path of reforms which, 
based on partial changes and on a continuity logic, may enable the creation of a pension system 
that is predictable and sustainable in time. 
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 Graphs and tables 
 
Graph 1. Expenditure in pension benefits of the Argentine Pensions System and its contributive 
financing, 1944-2010 
 
Source: Bertranou, Cetrángolo, Grushka and Casanova (2011). 
 
 
	  	  
35	  
Graph 2. Activity condition and type of labour insertion of population between 18 and 65 years 
old, 1991-2010. 
 
 
Source: Bertranou, Cetrángolo, Grushka and Casanova (2011). 
 
	  	  
36	  
Graph 3. Expenditure and total resources of the National Social Security Administration 
(ANSES), 1995-2010 
  
Source: Own calculation based on the database of the Investment Account (Department of Finance). 
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Graph 4. Coverage of the pension system for the population over 65, 1991-2010. 
  
Source: Bertranou, Cetrángolo, Grushka and Casanova (2011). 
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Graph 5. Ratio of pension benefits with minimum benefit, 1991-2010  
 
 Source: Own calculation based on Bertranou, Cetrángolo, Grushka and Casanova (2011). 
 
	  	  
39	  
Graph 6. Proposed benefit scheme 
  
Source: Bertranou, Cetrángolo, Grushka and Casanova (2011). 
 
Unive rsal	  
benefit
30	  years	  of	  
contributions
Contributions	  to	  the	  
system	  (years	  /wages)
Minimum	  
pens ion	  
bene fit
Maximum	  
pension	  
benefit
Benefit	  level
Determined	  by	  years 	  of	  
contributions 	  and	  incorporates	  
some	  relationship 	  to	  wages
Determined	  by	  wage	  level	  and,	  to 	  
a	  lesser	  degree,	  the	  excess	  of	  years	  
of	  contributions 	  beyond	  30
Complement	  for	  workers	  
with	  scarce	  years 	  of	  
contributions
Prportional
benefit
Complement	  for	  wor kers	  
with	  low 	  wages
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Table 1. Coverage of the pension system in the population over 65, as per specified categories. 
2005 and 2010 
 
 
2005 2010 Difference	  (p.p.)
68.9 90.7 21.8
Men 73.1 86.8 13.7
Women 66.3 93.3 27.0
65-­‐69 48.6 80.4 31.9
70-­‐74 67.9 95.4 27.5
75-­‐79 82.0 95.9 13.9
80+ 85.4 96.6 11.2
Incompl	  Prim	  Ed 65.0 92.0 26.9
Compl	  Prim	  Ed 68.6 92.5 23.9
Compl	  Sec	  Ed 73.6 87.5 13.9
Quintile	  1 36.6 83.9 47.3
Quintile	  5 80.2 84.1 3.9
Income
Category
Total
Gender
Age
Education
 
Source: Bertranou, Cetrángolo, Grushka and Casanova (2011). 
 
	  	  
41	  
Table  2. Special schemes  
Men Women
24.241 65 60 30 -
PBU + 45% a 
52,5%
Diplomats National Foreign Service Staff 22.731 65 65 0%
22.929 2%
23.026 2% 82% (at least)
23.626 2% 82% (at least)
Teaching staff
Teaching staff of initial, primary, middle,
technical and non-university terciary levels 24.016 60 57 25 2% 82%
Magistrates 
and other
President, Vice-president and Judges of the
Supreme Court of the Nation. Magistrates
and officials of the Judicial Power, of the
National Public Prosecution Authority, and
of the National Prosecuting Authority on
Administrative Investigation.
24.018 60 60 20 1% 82%
85%30 (with 15 
continuous 
years in the 
scheme, or 20 
discontinuous 
years)
Name Workers benefited Laws
General Scheme (Argentine Integrated Pension 
System)
Retirement age
Contribution 
years (1)
Replacement 
rate (3)
Differential 
contribution(2)
Researchers
Staff carrying out the following tasks in the
bodies listed in said laws: technical-
scientific activities on research and
development and management thereof, on a
full-time basis, and full-time faculty
members of national universities, carrying
out similar activities.
65 60
Note: (1) in some specific cases, retirement age may vary. (2) differential benefit regarding the regulatory provisions 
of the general scheme. (3) Replacement rate is not completely comparable because it is computed on different bases.  
Source: Own calculation. 
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Table  3. Pension income or pension as compared to total income of elderly adults as per income 
quintile, 1995, 2005, and 2010. 
 
  
1995 2005 2010 1995 2005 2010
1	  (poorest) 91% 42% 89% 8% 7% 5%
2 91% 77% 92% 21% 12% 13%
3 92% 84% 95% 22% 23% 30%
4 87% 82% 87% 26% 28% 26%
5	  (richest) 82% 76% 75% 22% 30% 25%
Total 88% 78% 87% 100% 100% 100%
Quintile
Income	  of	  pension	  system	  /	  Total	  
income
Position	  of	  elderly	  adults	  in	  
distribution	  of	  income
 
Source: Own calculation based on the permanent household survey (EPH). 
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Annex 1. Old-age, disability and survivorship benefits. National System (SIPA + MDS) 
 
Scheme Old-­‐age Disability Death
Pension Disability	  pension
30	  contribution	  years
Total	  disability	  (physical	  or	  
intelectual)	  for	  performing	  any	  
activity
Retirement	  age:	  60	  for	  women	  and	  
65	  for	  men
Regularity	  in	  contributions,	  
regardless	  of	  age	  or	  seniority	  at	  
service
Not	  receiving	  any	  kind	  of	  pension	  benefit
Not	  having	  any	  property,	  income	  or	  resources	  of	  any	  kind	  that	  ensure	  
subsistence	  of	  applicant	  and	  his/her	  family	  group.	  Not	  having	  any	  
family	  members	  obliged	  and	  able	  to	  provide	  alimony
Foreigners	  must	  provide	  proof	  of	  a	  20-­‐year	  continuous	  residence	  in	  
Argentina
Age	  for	  old	  age	  benefit:	  70-­‐year
Contributive	  
(SIPA)
Survivorship	  pension.	  Regularity	  in	  
contributions	  (or	  having	  a	  disability	  
pension)
Semi-­‐contributive	  
(SIPA)
Moratorium
"Facilitated"	  access	  to	  persons	  that	  have	  reached	  retirement	  age	  (and/or	  other	  requirements)	  without	  the	  
necessary	  contribution	  years;	  	  transitory	  nature,	  since	  the	  periods	  without	  contributions	  that	  could	  be	  
included	  must	  be	  prior	  to	  September	  30th,	  1993
Old	  age	  benefit
It	  generates	  survivorship	  pension
10	  contribution	  years	  (5	  during	  the	  8	  years	  prior	  to	  termination	  of	  
service)
Retirement	  age:	  65	  years	  for	  disability,	  70	  for	  old	  age	  (67	  for	  rural	  
workers)
Non-­‐contributive	  
(MDS)
PNC
These	  only	  generate	  under	  certain	  
special	  conditions
 
Note: Argentine Integrated Pensions System (SIPA) and Ministry of Social Development (MDS). 
Source: Bertranou, Cetrángolo, Grushka and Casanova (2011). 
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Annex 2. Evolution of the composition of the population by large age groups and of the 
dependency rate, 1950-2050 
 
  Source: CELADE. 
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Annex 3. Elderly adult population and pension income, type and amount of benefits, 2010. 
 
 
Source: Bertranou, Cetrángolo, Grushka and Casanova (2011). 
 
